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REPLY TO BYU'S STATEMENTS OF THE CASE, 
THE ISSUES, AND THE FACTS 
Non-Parties and Movants to Intervene, Kenneth Duncan, KWD Associates, 
LC, Lee Duncan, and Julee Associates, LC, (herein "Non-Parties Duncan" or 
"Appellants Duncan", et al), adopt and incorporate herein all the responses and 
arguments of Appellant-Defendant TREMCO Legal Solutions, Inc. in its Reply 
Brief. The facts and arguments presented by TREMCO are accurate and 
supported by the record on appeal and by the authorities cited. We also rely upon 
and encourage this Court to review the facts, arguments and authorities cited in the 
Appellants' briefs in the B.Y.U. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 
P.3d 678, (Appeal docket #20020540), (herein "BYUv TREMCO") regarding the 
denial to Non-Parties Duncan of their due process rights and the illegality of the 
July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order. 
Appellants Duncan, et al. object to BYU's Statements of the Facts because 
Appellants' statements are replete with inaccurate, self serving innuendo and 
inferences that are not supported by the actual record to which BYU cites. 
Moreover, BYU's Statement of the Case is nothing more that a re-argument of 
BYU's conclusions, unsupported by any record citations. And, instead of making 
any substantive response to the significant constitutional issues and the denial of 
due process to Appellants, BYU now argues sixteen new "issues" on appeal, 
which it has improperly framed to lobby its position. 
Throughout its Appellee Brief, BYU seeks to justify its June 13, 2002 
Summary Judgment (now reversed) and its July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order, by 
claiming new facts and legal theories that were not before the district court when 
the Supplemental Order was entered. However, a closer examination of the 
substance of BYU's factual and legal arguments reveals that they really are the 
same arguments that this Court already rejected. BYU merely re-packages the 
same arguments with new catch-phrases. Whereas, the July 10, 2002 Supplement 
Order adjudges the Non-Parties liable because they "used" BYU's license as part 
of an "unincorporated association," now they are supposedly liable because 
SoftSolutions, Inc. allegedly "continued to use the license in affiliation with STC," 
after dissolution. (BYU's Brief, p. 15, para 11.) BYU drops the "unincorporated 
association" label but still makes the same false argument. Of course, there is no 
citation to the record that supports either allegation, and no showing of any proper 
legal reason why STC shareholders are personally liable for the SoftSolutions, Inc. 
corporate debt. 
A, THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
BYU again fails to articulate or to follow the proper standard of review 
relevant to this appeal. With the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the district 
court's proceedings now exposed, BYU attempts to hide behind unsupported 
factual innuendo, just as it did in the district court. The applicable standard of 
review in this case is the review of legal determinations by the district court and to 
which this Court will not defer. BYU v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 
f 13, 110 P.3d 678, 683. See also State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994) 
("[T]he interpretation of the effect of a prior judicial decision . . . constitutes a 
conclusion of law to which we accord no particular deference. Review is for 
correctness."); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("[T]he effect of a 
given set of facts is a question of law."). 
Even aside from the clear denial of due process by the entry of the July 10, 
2002 Supplemental Order, that Order was a preemptory, summary remedy, entered 
without any factual hearing or opportunity for one. The claim that non-parties had 
an opportunity and failed to controvert BYU's arguments prior to the 
Supplemental Order is patently absurd. The district court certainly did not apply 
the appropriate standard to view the facts and their inferences in the light most 
favorable to the party moved against. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1304 (Utah, 1987); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976); see 
BYUv. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, f 13. 
On appeal, this Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to 
Appellants and reviews for correctness whether the district court properly denied 
Appellants' motion to intervene to challenge a preemptory Supplemental Order 
that improperly determines the assets of the Non-Parties to be "joint assets" of an 
"unincorporated association." (R. 1145, 1146) This Court should not accord the 
trial court any deference because the district court ruled upon Appellants' motions 
and issues as matters of law, without any evidentiary hearings. Nova Cas. Co. v. 
Able Construction, 1999 UT 69, ^6, 983 P.2d 575; Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 68, f 14, 56 P.3d 524. 
B. BYU'S "MARSHALING" ARGUMENT 
BYU argues throughout its brief that Duncan, et al, failed to "marshal" 
factual evidence in support of the district court rulings that the Non-Parties were 
not denied due process by the Supplemental Order and that their motion to 
intervene was properly denied," (Appellee Brief, 40-43). 
BYU argues that this Court should affirm the Supplemental Order because 
Appellants have not "marshaled" all of the facts to show that Judge Stott's "factual 
finding" of no due process violation was clearly erroneous. Of course, the district 
court's determinations and rulings were not made upon "findings" of "disputed 
issues of material fact." The lower court rulings were made preemptorily, as a 
matter of law. As to Non-Parties Duncan, there was never any factual finding 
made of any disputed issue of material fact after any evidentiary hearing. BYU's 
argument is, at best, wide of the mark. 
The May 14, 2002 Ruling and the June 13, 2002 judgment against 
TREMCO were decided on summary judgment. According to the district court, 
there was not then any disputed fact. This court held in BYU v Tremco that even 
under these "undisputed" facts, BYU could not prevail. There was not any new, 
significant evidence to support the language of the Supplemental Order. 
The July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order is wholly dependant upon the May 
14, 2002 Ruling. This preemptory enforcement order purports to adjudicate, 
without so much as notice or an opportunity to be heard, the ownership and 
liability of the personal assets (e.g. the STC stock sale proceeds) owned by Non-
Parties Duncan. The Supplemental Order says that the stock sale proceeds of 
KWD Associates, LC and Julee Associates, LC are the joint assets of the non-
existent "Softsolutions association." This July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order is in 
no better position than the now-vacated summary judgment. Consistent with the 
standard of review on summary judgment, this court must "review the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Regal Ins, Co. v. Bott, 2001 UT 71,\ 2, 31 P.3d 524. Summary 
enforcement, like summary judgment, is only proper when "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact." Utah R, Civ, P. 56(c). In all summary enforcement 
proceedings, the district court did not resolve any factual issue by making 
"findings." The district court's stated "findings" in its Supplemental Order are not 
findings of disputed facts after testimony and witnesses. Indeed, Appellants were 
never afforded any due process opportunity to dispute anything. 
BYU's reliance on Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 does not 
support its "marshaling" argument. The requirements of the process depend upon 
the context in which it is applied. Id. at f 25. In this case, the context is that of a 
summary judgment against non-parties, adjudicating the ownership of their assets 
without notice or an opportunity to defend—a far cry from Chen. 
BYU's efforts to create a bogus requirement to "marshal" merely 
demonstrates BYU's inability to argue any valid, substantive defense for the July 
10, 2002 Supplemental Order. Moreover, BYU's claim that the district court 
subsequently made factual findings is patently false. The mere labeling of a ruling 
or determination as a "finding" does not make it one. Regardless of its label, a 
finding of fact that is actually a conclusion of law, will be treated as a conclusion 
of law. A conclusion of law, albeit labeled a "finding of fact," will be reviewed by 
this Court for correctness. Zions First Nat, Bank, N.A. v. National American Title 
Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). And, when asserted "findings of fact" 
are made on issues not raised in the pleadings, the findings will be considered 
nugatory and without effect, providing no support for the judgment reviewed. 
Maynard v. Locomotive Engineers' Mutual Life & Accident Ins, Ass'n, 14 Utah 
458, 47 P. 1030, 1031 (Utah 1897). 
Appellants do not just challenge the district court's Supplemental Order for 
its lack of supporting evidence in the record (albeit such is the case). Appellants 
challenge the July 10 Supplemental Order as a matter of law because it was 
entered summarily without due process, without any opportunity to be named, 
heard, or to defend. The Order divested Appellants of valid and valuable personal 
property rights. That denial of due process has never been remedied or cured. 
Without any support or rational explanation, BYU argues that Appellants 
Duncan, et al may not challenge Fourth District court Judge Howard's July 10, 
2002 Supplemental Order without first "marshaling" the record with respect to 
evidence and materials argued later to Fourth District Court Judge David Stott. 
Even evidence presented after the fact to Judge Stott does not satisfy the due 
process right to be heard and to defend that is required before entry of the 
preemptory order by a prior judge. Declaring "we're all bound by that order . . .", 
Judge Stott would not look behind the Supplemental Order or even reconsider its 
validity. (R. 8579, p. 33, 35). Judge Stott determined that the Supplemental Order 
was "the law of the case." (R. 8580, p.80). 
This Court's determination of the violations of due process should be a 
legal question. State v. Werner, 2003 UT App 268, ff 10-11, 76 P.3d 204 (stating 
that the voluntariness of a confession under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a legal question reviewed for correctness. The 
marshaling of all the evidence is not required). 
C. BYU'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All of BYU's asserted facts and efforts to re-wrap the nature of the 
proceedings below are so interlaced with unsupported innuendo and inaccuracy as 
to render their entire statement totally lacking in credibility. As noted by 
Appellant Tremco in its Reply Brief, the inaccuracies and misrepresentations by 
BYU are too numerous to list or fully discuss. Further examples, of BYU's false 
assertions include: 
1. BYU is "entitled to enforce the Softsolutions Judgment against the 
WordPerfect Proceeds based upon the findings made by Judge Howard as further 
supplemented by Judge Stott." BYU's brief, pp. 10-11. 
There was never any "evidentiary" hearing regarding BYU's arguments 
that the STC stock shares owned and sold by Non-Parties Duncan were assets of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. in 1994. Neither Judge Howard, nor Judge Stott, properly 
made "findings." There has never been any factual finding based upon admissible 
evidence that the STC stock shares were owned by SoftSolutions, Inc when 
SoftSolutions, Inc. dissolved in 1992, or when KWD Associates and Julee 
Associates sold their STC shares to WordPerfect in 1994. Indeed, until now, BYU 
has always claimed that these assets of Appellants Duncan, et al, were the "joint" 
assets of the "unincorporated association." BYU now attempts to "repackage" its 
previously rejected argument. 
2. BYU's "Addendum X" 
BYU presents no record evidence that actually supports its assertion that 
the nonparty STC's stock was still owned by Softsolutions, Inc at the time of the 
1994 stock sale to WordPerfect. BYU improperly refers the Court to an 
Addendum "X", a document dehors the record on appeal which this Court will not 
consider. Flick v. VanTassell, 547 P.2d 204 (Utah 1976); Douglas v. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 45 Utah 486, 146 Pac. 562, 564 (1915) BYU 
apparently believes that if it shouts often enough, then this Court will eventually 
believe its claim to be true. 
Exhibit X, in its entirety, is not a "public record." Moreover, BYU fails to 
disclose other associated corporate documents plainly rebutting BYU's assertions 
and showing that all STC Stock was owned by KWD, Julee and AST as of April, 
1990, which was even before the July, 1990 license agreement between BYU and 
SoftSolutions, Inc. 
3. Among other false "facts" argued by BYU, the following conclusory 
determinations in the July 10th Supplemental Order were not supported by BYU's 
evidence: 
a. Appellants Duncan, et al and STC "continued to carry on the 
Corporation's [SoftSolutions, Inc] business through use of the 
Corporation's assets . . . ." (Supp Order, para 4, R. 1149); 
b. "The dissolved Corporation, Duncan, Duncan, and 
Tedjamulia and STC continued to market products under the 
license agreements which were in the name of the 
Corporation." (Supp Order, para 5, R. 1148); 
c. There existed, "[i]n 1996, the unincorporated association, 
which then consisted of at least Duncan, Duncan and 
Tedjamulia and the dissolved corporation . . . ."; (Supp Order, 
para. 11, R. 1147); 
d. The 1998 SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment was entered against 
the "unincorporated association." The "unincorporated 
association appealed" and the 1998 judgment was affirmed by 
this Court against said "association." (Supp Order, para 12, 
13, R. 1147-46); 
e. The STC stock and stock sale proceeds, owned by nonparties 
KWD Associates, LC and Julee Associated, LC, were the 
"joint property of all associates of the unincorporated 
association " (Supp Order, para 17, R. 1145); 
f. SoftSolution, Inc.'s "assets included the license rights and 
products which belonged to the Corporation but which 
Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia caused to be transferred to 
WordPerfect . . ." at the time of the 1994 stock sale of STC. 
(Supp Order, para 21, R. 1144). 
4. BYU's Allegation of "Evidentiary Hearings." 
BYU falsely claims that the district court held "evidentiary hearings," 
commencing on June 3, 2003. There was no such hearing. In fact, Appellant and 
non-party Kenneth Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia were subpoenaed and ordered to 
appear and be examined in "supplemental proceedings," with their examination 
limited to the proceeds of the 1994 STC stock sale to WordPerfect. (R. 4077, 
4167) The district court ordered Appellants to appear and to answer BYU's 
questions as to their assets, despite Appellants' pending motions for stay of 
execution of the Supplemental Order, to intervene, and to set aside that Order. 
(R.1477, 1470, 1488; R. 8579, pp.26, 31-33). Appellant Duncan appeared and 
testified as ordered. (R. 4934, 4935). Mr. Tedjamulia appeared and testified as 
ordered. (R. 4936). Each was represented by his attorney during their 
examinations. Counsel for Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. were also present. But, 
these were not "evidentiary hearings," and neither Duncan nor Tedjamulia was 
allowed to assert the invalidity and unconstitutionality of the July 10, 2002 
Supplemental Order during these supplemental proceeding examinations. Later, 
the district court refused to consider any claim by Non-Parties Duncan that the 
Supplemental Order was flawed and illegally entered. "All supplemental 
proceedings does is allow inquiry with respect to information to satisfy judgment." 
(R.8579, p. 35; also, R. 8580, p.80) 
The transcripts of Duncan's supplemental examinations as to his assets did 
not exist at the time of the entry of the July, 2002 Supplemental Order. The 
transcripts were not considered by the district court at the time of August 22, 2003 
argument and the denials of Appellants5 motions to intervene and for stay. 
Notwithstanding, Ken Duncan testified multiple times during his 
examination that the stock shares of STC were owned by KWD Associates, LC, 
Julee Associates, LC, and AST Associates, LC at the time those STC shares were 
sold to WordPerfect Corporation in 1994 in a stock-sale transaction. (R. 4934, p. 
28, 45; R. 4935, pp.6, 79-82, 87, 90-91) These assets were owned by those STC 
shareholders and not by SoftSolutions, Inc. There was no admissible evidence in 
the record to the contrary. Even if the record shows just "one scintilla" of 
evidence contrary to BYU's new claim that SoftSolutions, Inc. owned the STC 
stock at the time of the stock's sale in 1994, then the preemptory July, 2002 
Supplemental Order would be defeated by a disputed issue of a material fact. 
5. BYU's statement that the July 10, 2002 "Supplemental Order does 
not hold Duncan, et al. personally liable for the SoftSolutions Judgment" is 
patently false. (BYU's brief at 62.) 
In addition to improperly and illegally adjudicating Duncan, et al.'s assets 
to be assets of the fictional "unincorporated association," there is no question that 
July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order separately imposes joint and several in 
personam liability upon Non-Parties Duncan, et al. Paragraph 24 of the Order 
recites: "[T]he Court hereby concludes that the shareholders of the Corporation 
[SoftSolutions, Inc.], including Duncan, Duncan, and Tedjamulia, are jointly liable 
for the debts and obligations incurred by the unincorporated association." (R. 
1043 (emphasis added).) Indeed, this Court has already recognized that the July 
10, 2002 Order "extend[s] liability for the SoftSolutions judgment to the Duncan 
individuals and entities." BYU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, ^ 10. BYU's attempts to 
now narrow the unconstitutional overreaching are without merit. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JULY 10, 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER IS VOID AND 
SHOULD BE VACATED BASED UPON THE BYU V. TREMCO 
DECISION. 
BYU has not provided any substantive or meaningful reason why this 
Court's decision in BYU v. Tremco Consultants Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678 
reversing the June 13, 2002 Summary Judgment, does not also apply to the July 
10, 2002 Supplemental Order. The district court's May 14, 2002 memorandum 
ruling is the factual and legal foundation for the entire July 10, 2002 Supplemental 
Order. 
Disingenuously, BYU now tries to distance its July 10, 2002 Supplemental 
Order and its voluminous collection proceedings from the now-reversed May 14, 
2002 Ruling and the vacated June 13, 2002 Summary Judgment. BYU seeks to 
package itself as a simple judgment creditor just following SoftSolutions, Inc. 
corporate assets. All of BYU's actions since Judge Howard's May 14, 2002 
Ruling (R. 1052) are highly dependent upon that ruling and its erroneous 
applications of the law to the "undisputed" facts. Each of the legal theories 
applied in the June 13, 2002 Judgment and in the July 10 Supplemental Order as 
the bases for non-party liability were reversed by this Court in B. Y. U. v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678. These are the very same theories 
that BYU continued to use to assert liability upon the non-party STC shareholders 
for the SoftSolutions, Inc. corporate debt. The entire July 10, 2002 Supplemental 
Order against the Non-Parties Duncan relies upon and applies these same rejected 
legal theories - specifically, the specious "unincorporated association," joint 
shareholder liability, fraudulent transfer, res judicata - to personally bind 
Duncans, et al. 
The July 10th Supplemental Order is illegal and void as to non-parties 
Duncan because: 
a. There is no legal basis for an "incorporated Association." (110 P.3d 
678,1J17-18) Therefore, paragraphs 4, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19 and 24 of 
the Supplemental Order, and the "finding" that Duncans are 
members of the "association" also fail. 
b. Non-parties Duncan are not liable for the SoftSolutions, Inc. 
judgment by reason of res judicata. (110 P.3d 678, f 35) Therefore, 
paragraphs 4, 7,14, 17, 21 of the Supplemental Order cannot bind 
these non-parties to the corporate judgment. 
c. As separate corporate entities, SoftSolutions, Inc., and STC, are 
separate and distinct from their officers and shareholders. That 
separate identity is observed and no "alter ego" was alleged or 
proved by BYU. Officers and stockholders are not in privity with 
their corporations and are not personally bound to pay the 
SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment. (110 P.3d 678, % 37-38) Therefore, 
there is no "alter ego" liability against Non-Party Duncans. 
d. There was no evidence before the district court that Tremco 
Consultants, Inc. "fraudulently" received a transfer of an asset of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. (110 P.3d 678, f^ 23). There was no evidence 
before the district court that any Appellant "fraudulently" received 
transfer of any SoftSolutions, Inc. asset or any STC asset. There was 
only the argument and innuendo from BYU. There is no undisputed 
evidence to support paragraphs 3-5, 12, 21, and 22 of the 
Supplemental Order (R. 1151-1145). 
When a trial court has based its ruling on a misunderstanding and 
misapplication of the law, and a correct application would produce a different 
result, Appellants are adversely affected and are entitled to have the error rectified 
in a proper adjudication under correct principles of law. Hoffman v. Life 
Insurance Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Reed v Alvey, 610 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) (decided under "equity" standards of review). The 
Supplemental Order is so reliant upon and interrelated with the district court's 
misapplication of the law that the entire Order should be deemed vacated by the 
BYU v. TREMCO decision. Every order since the May 13, 2002 Ruling that has 
allowed BYU to enforce the SoftSolutions, Inc. corporate debt against the non-
parties should be vacated. The reversal of the June 13, 2002 judgment should 
have returned the case to the point prior to the entry of the summary judgment, as 
if it had never been entered. Murray v. Murray, 856 P.2d 463 (Alaska 1993); 
Russell v. Board of Country Commissioners, 952 P.2d 492 (Ok. 1997). All 
enforcement proceedings subsequent to the reversed summary judgment should be 
vacated. Phebus v. Dunford, 114 Utah, 292, 294, 198 P.2d 973, 974 (1948). 
POINT II 
THE DENIAL OF NON-PARTY DUNCAN'S MOTION TO 
INTERVENE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND WAS NOT 
WAIVED BY APPELLANTS' SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS TO 
CHALLENGE BYU'S ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST 
APPELLANTS 
Before the entry of the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order, the district court 
never conducted any evidentiary hearing. The July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order 
significantly alters the character and extent of the original 1998 SoftSolutions Inc. 
Judgment and extends liability to Non-Parties Duncan adjudicating their assets to 
be assets of the debtor corporation. This was all done without due process. 
After entry of the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order, there was never any 
hearing, nor any finding entered, on any fact regarding the liability of Non-Parties 
Duncan or the ownership of their assets under the Supplemental Order. There was 
not any re-consideration or re-determination of whether Non-Parties Duncan could 
properly be bound by the May 14, 2002 Ruling (now vacated), or by the 
Supplemental Order. The district court's later determination that Appellants were 
not denied due process was not a finding based upon any evidentiary hearing, but 
was a legal conclusion premised upon the same legal theories that this Court has 
already rejected.1 Appellants were never parties, named or served, prior to the 
issuance of the Supplemental Order and the imposition of liability upon their 
property. BYU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, f43, 110 P.3d 678, 690. They were 
denied their right to intervene to defend their property. They should have been 
allowed to intervene as a matter of right to protect their own individual and 
separate property interests under Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civil Proc. 
BYU's arguments are that Appellants Duncans had adequate opportunity 
under then-Rule 69 to request a hearing upon execution, and that Duncans have 
"informally" intervened by their opposing each of BYU's execution and 
1
 The district court stated, "I do not perceive that the [July 10, 2002 Supplemental 
Order] improperly expands the BYU judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. or the 
judgment against Tremco. From my perspective in reviewing all of the 
information and listening to the arguments it is this Court's finding and 
perspective that it only provided an opportunity for collection of the judgment 
from the proceeds of the sale that could be properly executed on by reason of the 
proper identity of the companies and individuals. . . . I believe that Judge 
Howard's ruling and the observations he made in that ruling with respect to the 
support of his findings are proper and will remain the law of the case." July 22, 
2003 Hrg., R. 8580, p. 80. 
enforcement proceedings. BYU also argues there is no right to intervene because 
the district court has already ruled that Appellants' assets (e.g. the WordPerfect 
stock sale proceeds) are really SoftSolution's, Inc. assets. (Appellee's Brief at pp. 
32-39). 
BYU's arguments are nothing more than "bootstrapping." As discussed, 
Judge Stott did not conduct a "full rehearing." He did not hear any witness or 
schedule an evidentiary hearing. The court did nothing more than enforce the July 
10 Supplemental Order on its face, stating that the non-parties could be adequately 
protected by a Rule 69 hearing. The court failed to address that under former Rule 
69, Utah R. Civil Proc. (now part of Rule 64E(c), Utah R. Civil Proc.) any such 
hearing and resulting inquiry would be limited to whether the property being taken 
could be traced to the proceeds of the STC stock sale. (See Rannoch Hearing, R. 
8582, pp. 109-110) The court has not allowed any determination of the ownership 
of the STC Stock shares, applying the correct principles of law. Reed v. Alvey, 
610 P.2d at 1377. There has not been any reconsideration or determination 
whether the STC Stock was a "joint asset" of an "unincorporated association," or 
whether there was any "fraudulent transfer" as BYU alleged against Tremco 
Consulting, Inc. A Rule 69 post-attachment hearing did not provide any adequate 
means to be heard as to the merits or the district court's errors. 
Non-parties Duncan have never "intervened informally." Appellants 
Duncan, et al have never been permitted a full and fair hearing on the validity of 
the July 10 Supplemental Order as BYU suggests. BYU argues that the 
continuing objections filed by Non-Party Duncans to BYU's numerous execution 
proceedings constitute a de facto "intervention." Ken Duncan, Lee Duncan, KWD 
Associates, LC and Julee Associates, LC have been forced repeatedly to object to 
and defend against numerous post judgment proceedings by BYU. 
Notwithstanding, Appellants have never been properly named or served in the 
original proceeding wherein their property has been taken by the Supplemental 
Order. BYU's characterizations to the contrary are false. 
Since the July 10 Supplemental Order was entered, without notice or 
chance to defend, Appellants Duncan, et al.: 
1. Filed their motion to intervene, motion for stay and motion to 
set aside the Supplemental Order, with supporting affidavits 
of Kenneth Duncan, Neil Sabin and Alvin Tedjamulia and 
memoranda. (R. 1470, 1477, 1488, 1452, 1391) 
2. Received writs of garnishment served against their personal 
bank accounts at Bank of American Fork and Merrill Lynch. 
(R. 2557, 2581, 2732) 
3. Filed Motions to Quash and objections to the garnishment 
writs and subpoenas directed to their personal accounts. (R. 
2718,2685,2744,2762). 
4. Defended against BYU's post-Supplemental Order subpoenas 
against KWD Associates, LC, Julee Associates, LC and Ken 
Duncan. (R. 3629, 3690, 3848, 3868, 4213) 
Appeared on June 3, 2003 pursuant to subpoenas and the 
district court's order. (R. 4077, 4170, 4167, 4374). 
On July 22, 2003 argued their motions to intervene, for stay 
and to set aside the Supplemental Order. (R. 8580) 
Objected to BYU's submitted Orders denying Appellants' 
motions. (R. 4962, 5016) 
Joined in the motion of another non-party to approve alternate 
security and to stay enforcement of the Supplemental Order. 
(R. 5734) 
Received BYU's subpoenas of Duncan's personal accounts at 
Bank One and Zions Bank. (R. 5783, 5831, 5852) 
Received BYU's subpoenas directed to Heber Valley Bank 
and Goldman, Sacs Group Inc., and a garnishment to 
Manulife, Inc. 
Appeared at a hearing to join in and argue Motions to Quash 
Executions and a renewed Motion for Alternate Security. (R. 
6582) 
Moved and argued to set aside a sale of property BYU 
claimed was owned by KWD Associates, LC. (R. 6706, 
6708,7197,7200) 
Filed on August 30, 2004 a Motion to Strike BYU's attempt 
to amend its Tremco Complaint, which "amendment" was 
rejected by the Fourth District Court on September 21, 2004, 
when all pending motions were "stayed" by the district court. 
14. Appeared and defended against the November, 2004 
complaint-in-intervention by Heber Valley Bank and BYU's 
cross-claim regarding the interests of that bank in property 
owned by non-party Carie, LLC. 
Since denial of their Motion to Intervene, Motion for Stay and Motion to 
Set Aside the July 10 Supplemental Order, the non-parties Duncan have acted only 
to respond to and defend against the numerous BYU collections efforts filed 
against the personal assets of Kenneth and Marie Duncan and against KWD 
Associates, LC. Appellants' resistance of BYU's considerable collection attempts 
- attempts which are unconstitutional and illegal - certainly preserve Appellants' 
claims that they are being deprived of their property without due process. 
Appellants' resistance of BYU's attempts to collect from our personal assets does 
not constitute Appellants general "appearance," in the action informal or 
otherwise. Neither does it cure the due process violations. Appellants have never 
been allowed their right to answer to specific allegations or to be heard in an 
impartial, full and fair hearing on the merits of BYU's claim that Appellants' 
assets should be the assets of the corporate debtor, SoftSolutions, Inc. 
Finally, BYU's argument that the motion to intervene is now moot or not 
meritorious because the district court has now so ruled only "begs the question." 
If, as BYU argues, the district court has ruled that the July 10 Supplemental Order 
is not enforceable against the "personal assets" of the Appellants then the entire 
matter should be decided adversely to BYU, because the STC stock and its sale 
proceeds were and are the personal assets of KWD Associates, LC and Julee 
Associates, LC. And, if the interests of Appellants have been adequately 
represented by TREMCO, as BYU has argued, then this Court's TREMCO 
decision also decides this appeal in Appellants' favor and vacates the 
Supplemental Order. 
The STC stock shares were owned and sold by the STC stockholders of 
record—Appellants KWD Associates and Julee Associates. The STC shares were 
not an asset of SoftSolutions, Inc. when that company dissolved in 1992 or when 
the STC stock was sold in 1994. BYU cannot lawfully collect a corporate debt 
from its shareholders without first making the shareholders parties, stating BYU's 
claims by complaint against them, and allowing those shareholders their due 
process to answer, defend and be heard. This BYU has never done. Appellants' 
motion to intervene, showing that the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order was void, 
should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The gravamen of each of the appeals and writ proceedings before this Court 
is that Appellants and their separate assets (including any proceeds of the sale of 
their STC shares of stock) were not, and are not, the assets of SoftSolutions, Inc., 
the corporate judgment debtor. BYU has not, and cannot, show otherwise when 
the relevant legal principles are properly applied to this case. 
Most particularly under our Constitutions, if BYU desires to make a claim, 
then Appellants are entitled to the basic due process of having BYU's claim 
against them properly stated, and be given proper notice, the right to appear and 
defend, and the right to a full and fair adjudication under proper legal principles. 
The entry of the 2002 Supplemental Order which deprived Appellants' of their 
property was clearly error. Appellants should have been allowed to intervene, as a 
matter of right, to show the district court its error and to obtain a correct 
adjudication. 
At this point in the proceedings, regardless of whether Appellants' 
intervention is allowed or not, this Court should reverse and vacate the July 10, 
2002 Supplemental Order as void. 
Respectfully Submitted this IP day of April, 2006. 
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